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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
________________ 
 
No. 15-2372 
 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
DONALD W. MCLAUGHLIN, 
                                Appellant 
 
 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Crim. No. 1-11-cr-00721-001) 
District Judge:  Honorable Joseph E. Irenas 
________________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
on March 14, 2016 
 
Before: FUENTES,** CHAGARES, and RESTREPO, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: September 9, 2016) 
 
 
 
OPINION* 
 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge. 
 
                                              
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
** Judge Fuentes assumed senior status on July 18, 2016. 
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 Defendant Donald McLaughlin pled guilty to one count of unlicensed firearms 
dealing and one count of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon, and was sentenced 
to 57 months’ imprisonment.  He argues that the District Court wrongly denied his 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea.  We disagree and will affirm. 
I. 
McLaughlin accrued multiple felony convictions between 1996 and 2008.  
Between May and November 2010, McLaughlin sold prescription drugs and four 
firearms to a confidential informant.  In October 2011, McLaughlin pled guilty to one 
count of firearms dealing without a federal license and one count of unlawfully 
possessing firearms as a convicted felon.   
At the plea hearing, the District Court questioned McLaughlin’s counsel about his 
competence to plead guilty.  Counsel stated that during her time with him, McLaughlin 
had not appeared to be under the influence of drugs or alcohol or to be suffering from any 
mental disabilities that would render the sentencing hearing unfair.  McLaughlin was 
placed under oath, after which he testified that he was satisfied with the services of his 
defense counsel; that any medications he had taken did not affect his mental status; that 
he understood the charges, sentencing exposure, and rights he was waiving; that he had 
read the plea agreement multiple times and discussed it with his attorney; and that no one 
had threatened him, paid him, or promised him anything apart from what was in the 
agreement in exchange for his plea.  McLaughlin admitted the factual basis for the 
charges against him and at one point corrected a factual error in the District Court’s 
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questioning.  Following this testimony, the District Court found that McLaughlin was 
pleading guilty knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.   
In April 2012, McLaughlin replaced his defense counsel and successfully moved 
for a competency examination.  The competency report concluded, inter alia, that 
McLaughlin “is able to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings 
against him and to assist in his defense.”  The report further stated that McLaughlin “does 
have mild cognitive impairments but the nature and severity of these deficits do not 
appear to sufficiently impact his competency-related abilities.”   
In May 2013, McLaughlin moved to withdraw his guilty plea, asserting for the 
first time that he was incompetent at the time of the plea hearing because he was 
experiencing drug withdrawal, grieving his mother’s death, and suffering from long-term 
“psychological issues.”  He also claimed that his first attorney had coerced him into 
pleading guilty by claiming that the District Court would view him unfavorably if he 
raised the issue of his mental competence.   
The District Court denied the motion after a hearing.  In the course of rendering its 
decision from the bench, the court reviewed the transcript from the sentencing hearing 
and recounted McLaughlin’s demeanor and comportment at the plea hearing.  The 
District Court noted that McLaughlin had been forthcoming rather than reluctant, and that 
he had given complete and knowledgeable answers to the court’s questions.  The court 
found it “totally unbelievable,” given McLaughlin’s responsiveness and his willingness 
to confront his current counsel, that the first attorney could have overborne his will and 
coerced him into pleading guilty.   
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In July 2013, the District Court sentenced McLaughlin to two concurrent terms of 
57 months’ imprisonment.  This appeal followed. 
II.1 
A defendant “is not entitled to withdraw [his] plea simply at his whim.”2  Rather, 
he must “show a fair and just reason for requesting the withdrawal.”3  This “substantial 
burden”4 cannot be met by “[b]ald assertions of innocence” or unsubstantiated allegations 
that the plea was involuntary.5  “When determining whether a defendant has shown a 
‘fair and just reason’ for withdrawing a plea, a district court must consider whether: (1) 
the defendant asserts his innocence; (2) the defendant proffered strong reasons justifying 
the withdrawal; and (3) the government would be prejudiced by the withdrawal.”6  We 
review a district court’s denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea for abuse of 
discretion.7   
With respect to the first factor, McLaughlin did not, and could not, meaningfully 
assert his innocence.8  At oral argument on the motion to withdraw, his counsel referred 
obliquely to the possibility of an entrapment defense.  But an entrapment defense requires 
the defendant to establish government inducement of the crime and a lack of 
                                              
1 The District Court had jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We 
have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
2 United States v. Jones, 336 F.3d 245, 252 (3d Cir. 2003).   
3 Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2).   
4 United States v. Siddons, 660 F.3d 699, 703 (3d Cir. 2011) 
5 Jones, 336 F.3d at 252-255. 
6 Siddons, 660 F.3d at 703 (internal quotations omitted).   
7 Id. 
8 See Jones, 336 F.3d at 252 (“Assertions of innocence must be buttressed by facts in the 
record that support a claimed defense.”) (internal quotations and citation omitted). 
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predisposition on the part of the defendant.9  We see nothing in the record that could 
plausibly permit a jury to conclude that McLaughlin was “induced” to sell firearms to the 
confidential informant.10  Certainly, McLaughlin has offered no evidence of government 
coercion.  And given McLaughlin’s extensive criminal history, it is unlikely in the 
extreme that he could have established a lack of predisposition to the crime.  The District 
Court therefore properly determined that McLaughlin could not satisfy the “innocence” 
element of the withdrawal test. 
As to the second factor, McLaughlin has not offered any “strong reasons” 
justifying withdrawal.  McLaughlin claims that he was not competent at the time he 
entered the plea, but the only evidence bearing directly on his mental state is the court-
ordered evaluation that expressly found him competent one year after the guilty plea.  
McLaughlin argues that the evaluation does not necessarily prove his mental state at the 
time of the plea.  But merely deflecting the evidence against him is insufficient; the 
burden is on him to furnish contemporaneous evidence that affirmatively proves his 
mental incompetence.  All we have is the plea hearing transcript and the District Court’s 
recollection of the hearing, both of which confirm that McLaughlin was engaged, cogent, 
and unhesitant throughout.   Nor is there any reason to credit McLaughlin’s related (and 
entirely unsupported) claim that his attorney coerced him into pleading guilty.  In 
                                              
9 United States v. Wright, 921 F.2d 42, 44 (3d Cir. 1990). 
10 See, e.g., PSR ¶ 15 (In a meeting at McLaughlin’s residence, McLaughlin showed the 
informant a shotgun and offered to sell the shotgun and a .22 caliber rifle to him); ¶¶ 21-
22 (In a second meeting at McLaughlin’s residence, McLaughlin and informant 
negotiated a price for an MK III rifle); ¶ 23 (McLaughlin offered to sell the informant a 
sawed-off shotgun). 
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denying McLaughlin’s withdrawal motion, the District Court observed that McLaughlin 
exhibited no tension with his attorney when giving his plea and had proven himself 
willing and able to confront his attorney over matters of strategy.  Absent extraordinary 
circumstances, we will not second-guess a trial judge’s assessment of a defendant’s 
demeanor or credibility.11  There is no reason to do so here. 
Finally, McLaughlin argues that the government has failed to demonstrate that it 
would have been prejudiced by a withdrawal of the plea.  But “the Government need not 
show such prejudice when a defendant has failed to demonstrate that the other factors 
support a withdrawal of the plea.”12  Because McLaughlin has no credible claim to 
innocence and has offered insufficient reasons for withdrawal, the District Court did not 
abuse its discretion in denying his withdrawal motion. 
III. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
                                              
11 See Gov’t of V.I. v. Berry, 631 F.2d 214, 220 (3d Cir. 1980) (“The good faith, 
credibility and weight of a defendant’s assertions . . . in support of a motion [to withdraw 
a guilty plea] are preeminently issues for the hearing court to decide.” (internal quotations 
omitted)). 
12 Jones, 336 F.3d at 255. 
